

# Hate Thy Communist Neighbor in the North: Protestants and Election Outcomes in South Korea

## **Abstract**

In this paper, we investigate how historical persecution and displacement can form the foundation of religious influence on politics today. While the churches in South Korea are highly decentralized and operate under different denominations, many of them are founded by former Protestant refugees from the north who were persecuted by the communist regime and defected to the south before the Korean War. We show that the religious group influenced recent presidential election outcomes in South Korea by supporting the conservative party, whose firm stance against the northern neighbor aligned with the group's own. Our analysis using the Korean Social General Surveys confirms that South Korean Protestants have a unique attitude toward North Korea, while they do not differ from others in general economic and social attitudes.

**Keywords:** Religion, Protestantism, Communism, North Korea, South Korea, Elections.

# 1 Introduction

How do religious groups come together to affect political outcomes? While these groups may have institutional support to exert direct influence on the state (e.g., state religions in theocracies), they are often decentralized and operate as disparate institutions from the state with little impact on politics. In this paper we present Protestants in South Korea as a case of a decentralized religious group in a secular democratic state, in which the group was still able to gather electoral support and affect election outcomes. Specifically, we show that between the two recent and comparable presidential elections in 2007 and 2012, districts with increases in Protestant concentration also saw significantly greater support for the conservative party. We argue that a historical trauma of persecution and displacement acted as a powerful cause to bring different denominations together for political mobilization, and present empirical support from the Korean General Social Surveys.

South Korea has one of the highest concentration of Protestants per capita in the world<sup>1</sup>, and despite it being a secular state, the country has arguably witnessed Protestants exercise significant influence on domestic politics. Given its size, the literature in economics of religion suggests that Protestants in South Korea would likely attract politicians with their grassroots networks for electoral mobilization. Politicians, for example, can take extreme stands on religious issues favorable to the group (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro 2005) or compete with religious leaders for political patronage and power (Chaney 2013). Conversely, competition among different religious groups may also induce Protestants to seek state sponsorship and political protection to successfully become the dominant force in the market.

While these arguments are well established in the literature, the Korean case differs in its context and historical background, and offers more nuanced implications. The main distinction here is that although Protestants in South Korea comprise the largest religious group, they are also highly fractionalized from within and have shown little cohesion as a

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<sup>1</sup>According to the National Household Survey in 2015, 19.7 percent of population identified their faith as Protestant, followed by Buddhist (15.5 percent).

group, making it difficult for politicians to mobilize them. With the exception of their stance on North Korea, there is no collective political identity among Protestants wielding significant influence on electoral outcomes. Since policy platforms need to address many more issues than just North Korea, Protestants do not appeal as an attractive target group for electoral mobilization. They consequently have not necessarily benefited from political protection or acted in unison against other religious groups for dominance in the country.

Given that Protestants in South Korea comprise a major religious group without unifying political ideology and clout, how did they still mobilize to impact the election results? We argue that the historical persecution and displacement of Protestants in North Korea who have since defected down to the south played a critical role. The spread of Protestantism in Korea can first be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when many American missionaries settled in Pyongyang. The missionaries' focus on education, mercantilism and social welfare, along with messages of the gospel, successfully met with a large following of converts.<sup>2</sup> When the country gained its independence from Japan at the end of World War II, Pyongyang also became the capital city of the communist regime and religious freedom was banned by the new state. This led a large number of Protestants to defect to South Korea between 1945 to 1953, after their churches and properties in the north were seized by the communists. Many Protestant defectors subsequently fought against the communist armies during the Korean War as part of their endeavors to recover them.<sup>3</sup> A large number of influential pastors in the biggest churches in South Korea are either defectors from the North or have direct family connections to North Korea. Furthermore, Protestants flourished

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<sup>2</sup>Pyongyang was originally hailed as the "Jerusalem of the East" in the early twentieth century by western missionaries (Chung 2001, pg.53); by 1908, the city had the largest number of self-supporting churches (Clark 2010, pg.240-241). The northern provinces' openness to Protestantism can arguably be attributed to their role as the gateway to all the missionaries traveling by land, and as an open channel for communication, cultural and commercial exchange with mainland China. This contrasted with the southern regions of the peninsula which, surrounded by three seas, were considered isolated, traditional, and backwardly (Clark 2010, pg.235).

<sup>3</sup>At the time of liberation, approximately 200,000 Protestant lived in North Korea, comprising about 60 percent of the total Protestant population in the peninsula; out of these, 35 to 50 percent (70,000 to 100,000) defected to the south between 1945 and 1953 until the end of the Korean War, becoming founders and leaders of major Presbyterian and Methodist churches and related organizations (Choi 1982).

especially under South Korea’s anti-communist propaganda in the 1970s and 1980s. We thus argue that their collective support for the conservative party, whose policies have stood in contrast to the liberal party’s more lenient and cooperative attitudes towards the North Korean regime, is derived from the shared historical experience of persecution and exile.<sup>4</sup>

Can the Protestant link to conservatism be explained by other mechanisms? For example, the literature suggests that the religious group’s support for the conservative party may stem from economic attitudes such as self-discipline and hard work, those closely related to the Protestant ethic and argued to be the spirit of capitalism by Weber (1958).<sup>5</sup> Becker and Woessmann (2009)’s work also suggests that as in Martin Luther’s Reformation, Protestant leaders (missionaries and pastors) in Korea also might have encouraged building schools and promoted education to have positive economic impact through human capital development. Yet another argument drawn from Woodberry (2012) suggests that in addition to human capital development, the Protestant missionaries in Korea may have planted the seed of democratization.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, historical factors specific to Korea have also influenced attitudes towards work-ethic, human capital accumulation, and discipline. Long before the missionaries, the country maintained a Confucian tradition that promoted frugality, discipline, diligence, and education. The period of foreign invasions in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent Japanese colonization in the early twentieth century also led to a series of enlightenment movements, educating the masses and promoting human capital development independent of the missionaries. Finally, it was the northern part of the peninsula that had more missionaries but at the same time established a communist state shortly after independence.

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<sup>4</sup>We test this hypothesis empirically with our data, but also note that similar claims have been made in other fields; in a qualitative sociological study, Kang (2004) for example traces the origin of the political conservatism of Korean Protestants back to the successful settlement of North Korean Protestant refugees in South Korea around the Korean War period.

<sup>5</sup>Weber (1958)’s seminal work is reviewed in detail by Iannaccone (1998) and Iyer (2016), among others.

<sup>6</sup>Other works also suggest that missionaries have had positive impact on human capital development in developing countries in Asia, South America and Africa through enhanced provision of public education and healthcare (Valencia Caicedo 2019*b*; Waldinger 2017; Bai and Kung 2015; Calvi and Mantovanelli 2018; Valencia Caicedo 2019*a*).

All of these suggest that while Protestant roots are likely important, there are multiple historical events that could also explain Koreans developing capitalist attitudes or espousing a specific political ideology to support the conservative party. Our findings from the Korean General Social Surveys show that Protestant affiliation in fact plays a little role when it comes to key economic policy issues such as individual welfare, economic growth, taxation, and income redistribution (Table 4). Furthermore in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections, both the incumbent and the challenger party leaders ran with similar centralist policy platforms, with the exception of their stance on North Korea. We thus find it unlikely that the Protestant link to conservatism came from the party's stance on economic policies. Instead, Protestants' hostile stance against North Korea formed the basis of their support for the conservative party.

The findings from our paper contribute to studies of religion and politics. While the previous works are mainly based on the United States and provide evidence that religious groups may influence election results (Layman 1997; Green 2007; Margolis 2018), our paper brings into focus a unique context which can explain the root of Protestants' support for the conservative party, independent of biblical values and instead determined by a history of conflict and displacement. The paper is also part of the literature focusing on the economic history of religion and conflict.<sup>7</sup> The Korean War never ended and remains as one of the world's longest enduring conflicts in modern history. South Korea has subsequently dealt with security threats and legitimacy issues surrounding the North Korean regime, and they continue to dominate political discourses with varying degrees of salience for nearly seven decades since the War. Beyond the domestic concerns, the ongoing political instability and conflict in the Korean peninsula have sizeable security impact in Asia and the greater Pacific

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<sup>7</sup>The literature has covered numerous topics, including civil conflicts that were religiously motivated (Basedau, Pfeiffer and Vüllers 2016; Isaacs 2016) and increasingly more so in recent decades (Svensson and Nilsson 2018); competition among religious groups that led to intensification of non-religious civil conflicts (for example, Catholic Church and Pentecostal churches in Columbia (Galindo-Silva and Tchuente 2019)); and religious fundamentalist groups affecting the onset, type and duration of civil conflict (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Toft 2007; Berman and Laitin 2008; Hegghammer 2011; Toft and Zhukov 2015; Basedau, Pfeiffer and Vüllers 2016; Isaacs 2017), among others.

region. It is under this substantive context that we bring forth the case of Protestants and their influence on politics. While we also look at economic attitudes such as views on state intervention and trust in market economy, topics commonly covered in other works on religion (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2003; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Basten and Betz 2013), our case study specifically focuses on electoral outcomes driven at least in part by Protestants' deeply rooted animosity against North Korea, and the subsequent tension that continues on between the two Koreas.

Finally, to the extent that the rapid spread of Protestantism coincided with South Korea's initial democratic transition and economic development, our case study also supports the works on missionaries, that conversionary Protestants had influenced the rise and spread of stable democracies as well as economic development (Woodberry 2012; Bai and Kung 2015; Becker, Pfaff and Rubin 2016). At the same time, the country's unique historical background suggest that Protestants' political support for the conservative party may be derived from more complex and historical underpinnings. The case of Korea specifically provides an example in which North Korea, the place of abundant missionary activity in the beginning of the twentieth century, actually experienced the opposite of democratization: the rise of a communist state. We explain that the Protestant converts who experienced any democratizing effect of missionaries likely defected to South Korea. Furthermore, we argue that at least part of South Korea's democratization efforts stemmed from historical events unique to the country, including enlightenment movements for independence and protests against dictatorship following post-independence. These events independently espoused ideals of liberty and reform, rule of law and education, i.e., values that spurred democracy. Our study thus shows that both the migration of converts as well as other specific historical events are as important as the prevalence of missionaries in order to understand South Korea's democratization process.

## 2 Protestantism and Election in Korea


When Korea became independent from Japan's occupation in 1945, the peninsula was divided into the communist north and the south. By the end of 1945, the conflict between communists and Protestants increasingly intensified. A large number of Protestants in the south, supporting the US army military government and emerging political figure Rhee Syngman, persecuted communists (Kang 2005, pg.44-45). Christians in the north advocated for freedom of religion and assembly. Finding church leaders to be too influential, the communist government under Kim Il-sung in the north forced churches to register under a government-sponsored Christian League, confiscated church properties, and reduced the number of churches in the north (Park 2011, pg.41). Though some minor Christian organizations supporting the communist government emerged, those that criticized the government were charged with treason, or escaped to the south (Kim 1992). Many Protestants, especially those who defected from the north, fought vigorously against the communists during the Korean War (1950-1953), in hopes to reclaim their land, properties and churches. During the War, Protestants not only fought against the North Korean and the Chinese army, but also antagonized a large number of South Korean civilians suspected of siding with the communists.<sup>8</sup>

In the subsequent period, Park Chung-hee led a military coup and successfully headed an authoritarian regime that enforced anti-communism and prioritized economic growth for eighteen years. At the same time, Korea experienced an explosive growth of Protestant population and emergence of big churches. The congregants in these churches were generally supportive of Park, although some rallied for democratization movement in opposition of the dictator regime (Chang 2015). According to Lee (2009), the average annual GDP growth rate from the 1960s to 1980s was around 9.2 percent, while the Protestant population had

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<sup>8</sup>See for example the Seobuk (Pyongan) Youth Group, a semi-paramilitary group supported by the South Korean government and largely led by Protestants. The organization victimized a large number of civilians whom they suspected to be communist sympathizers or potential collaborators, before and during the Korean War (Kang and Hong 2017; Yoon 2015).

Figure 1: Timeline of Key Political Events and Protestantism in Korea



an annual growth rate of approximately 9.3 percent between 1972 to 1981, from 1,570,649 to 4,571,920. Figure 1 summarizes the key political events and the spread of Protestantism in Korea since the late 19th century.

Some of the ways that a church can influence its congregants are through affirming sermons and fellowship networks. For example, ministers delivering political messages embedded in biblical teachings (e.g., preaching on the sin of idolatry, in the context of North Korea’s cult of personality surrounding the Kim family), as well as prayer groups for the salvation of suffering North Koreans under the dictator regime, focusing on providing aid to North Korean refugees and missionaries, are commonly found especially in large churches.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, although Protestants successfully grew in size to become the largest religious group in Korea, it also became the most decentralized. Korean Buddhism by comparison

<sup>9</sup>The literature indeed suggests that religion can indeed shape congregants’ political preferences through sermons and scriptures, congregant networks and organized public goods support. Various studies show that religious organizations may impact political attitudes with influential religious messages, and by providing beneficial social networks for the members. For example, McClendon and Riedl (2015) show that political participation among respondents can be explained by self-affirming religious messages in Kenya. Costa, Marcantonio Junior and Castro (2020) show that the Brazilian voters who converted to Pentecostal churches due to economic difficulties tend to elect politicians promoting fundamental religious principles. Furthermore, Campbell (2013) discusses political participation as an outcome of not only individual correlates, but also social networks formed in churches. Potential converts are thus likely to enjoy membership in a organization that readily provides religious messages and support networks, the two primary channels through which people are proselytized. Among the many outcomes that one may imagine in becoming religious, experimental studies have uncovered some of the “fruits of the spirit” to be statistically significant. The works suggest that when respondents are “treated” with the religious factor, they tend to be more giving (Condra, Isaqzadeh and Linardi 2017; Warner et al. 2015), politically active (McClendon and Riedl 2015) and pro-social (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007). These behavioral and attitudinal changes may significantly affect the believers’ political actions, especially when the religious factor, driven by certain agendas, primes them with messages that are independent of religious core beliefs.

is primarily represented by a dominant lineage called the Jogye Order, while the Catholic Church of South Korea is officially under the worldwide Catholic Church following directives from the Vatican. In other words, both Korean Buddhism and Catholic Church are governed by centralized and hierarchical administrations. By contrast, we have identified well over 250 distinct sub-denominations within the Protestant body in our church data, most of which belong to one of the four larger denominational groups. The major denominations include the Methodists, the Baptists and the Evangelicals, as well as the Presbyterians who have further split into two separate organizations: the General Assembly of Presbyterian Church in Korea and the Presbyterian Church of Korea. The split in the Presbyterian denomination occurred in the 1990s due to theological debates on whether or not to participate in the ecumenical movement.<sup>10</sup>

Existing models in economics of religions provide guidance on why Protestants in Korea have become decentralized and do not generally act in unison. First, Korea had been a developing state in which religious pluralism flourished. Spatial location models on religious pluralism and participation look at various services offered by churches as market goods, and predict that product differentiation in secular good provisions occur among religious organizations in order to minimize competition. Each church therefore caters to a congregant base with different religious and secular needs.<sup>11</sup> In cases of high inequality and inadequate state provision in developing states, Iyer (2016) suggests that these models are especially useful in explaining various levels of non-state public goods provision such as education and healthcare organizations. During Korea's rapid transition from a poor developing state into an economic powerhouse, the country saw a tremendous growth in the number of religious organizations, which have since come to serve less as providers of public goods and more as

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<sup>10</sup>Scholars have traced the origin of decentralization in Korean Protestant churches back to as early as the end of the Korean War (Lee 2009; Yang 2005). They have pointed out theological differences and power struggles among major churches (Lee 2009), as well as personal conflicts between prominent pastors (Yang 2005) as some of the main reasons behind the lack of cohesion since the 1950s. Furthermore as the size of the religious group grew rapidly over time, the divides have deepened (Yang 2007, 2008; Hyun 2015), resulting in more than 200 recognized sub-denominations within the Presbyterian Church alone (Yang 2005).

<sup>11</sup>See McBride (2008) and Montgomery (2003), as well as Iyer, Velu and Weeks (2014) for a relevant case study in India.

providers of social networks over time.

Second, critical to religious pluralism was the religious freedom that Korea has maintained since independence.<sup>12</sup> The supply of religion was unconstrained and many different religions as well as denominations established themselves. The market can be seen as competitive like those of other goods, as described in Adam Smith’s *the Wealth of Nations* and in *the Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Iyer 2016). Third, the non-cohesion among the Protestant churches in Korea may be explained by the popular club models of religion (Iannaccone 1992; Berman 2000; Chen 2010). These models predict a congregation of varying degrees of sectarian communities based on the levels of social networks and insurance for the more devoted adherents. According to them, Protestants being the mainstream religion in Korea country may explain why it is difficult to find cohesion within the highly decentralized group. Iannaccones seminal papers (Iannaccone 1992, 1997) in particular look at stigmas to screen out members; it is easy to free ride in Protestant churches and the lack of commitment and devotion are common, given the high number of competing organizations within the religious body. Mainstream Protestants thus do not promote religious intensity or cohesion, unlike smaller fundamentalist groups.<sup>13</sup>

### 3 Data

Our key dependent variable is the vote share of the presidential candidate from the conservative party in the presidential elections held in December 2007 and December 2012.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>While we do not investigate in depth the religious freedom in South Korea in this paper, numerous works offer rich insight on this important topic; see Johnson and Koyama (2019) for example for substantive discussions on its causes and consequences.

<sup>13</sup>Arce and Sandler (2003) for example show in a game-theoretic framework that fundamentalists are more cohesive and less willing to compromise. Levy and Razin (2012) show that more demanding religious groups are more cohesive and comprise those with extreme beliefs.

<sup>14</sup>We focus on the presidential rather than legislative elections for our analysis. Legislative elections in Korea run under a single member district plurality system, and the candidates themselves carry at least as much weight in appeal as the parties nominating them. Except for the southeastern (Yeongnam) or the southwestern regions (Honam), which are the core bases for the conservative and the liberal parties, respectively, other regions have not shown any clear or consistent leanings in their party support. A candidate’s educational background, occupation, local networks, and campaign platforms all play important roles in the legislative elections, and these appear to matter more than party membership.

Since we are interested in looking at the most conservative estimate of any long-term effect of historical persecution and displacement, we take the most recent election results to test our hypothesis. The years 2007 and 2012 are the most recent presidential election years.<sup>15</sup> Analyzing the two election years instead of others also enables us to control for any major pivotal shifts in the public sentiment against the incumbent party, and focus instead on how changes in Protestant presence, not overall public support for the conservative party, impacted the election outcomes. In both election years there was strong support for the conservative party pushing for economic development, and the party's presidential candidates (Lee and Park) became the 17th and the 18th president. Finally, the church location data we use in our paper were available only from 2002 and onwards, and in terms of comprehensiveness only comparable across the years from 2004 and onwards. This means that we are able to capture the period between 2004 and 2015, during which the two presidential election were held.

We collect the polling-station-level electoral outcome data from the National Election Commission (NEC) and aggregate the outcome at the district level.<sup>16</sup> From the election data, we construct the vote share variable for the candidate from the conservative party in each district.<sup>17</sup> The conservative vote share is calculated by dividing the number of votes cast to the candidates by the total number of votes, multiplied by one hundred.

Our key explanatory variable is the number of Protestant churches per thousand people in the years 2007 and 2012. We use this variable as a measure of Protestant concentration

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<sup>15</sup>The latest presidential election in 2017 was held as a by-election after then-president Park Geunhye was impeached and is not comparable to the previous elections.

<sup>16</sup>One potential issue with the administrative boundaries in South Korea is that a number of them may have been re-drawn due to urbanization over time. We take the districts in 2012 as the baseline, identify those that had either merged or split before, and match them to the corresponding districts.

<sup>17</sup>The main conservative party in the 2007 presidential election was the Grand National Party (GNP) (*Hannaradang*), which changed its name to the Saenuri Party in 2012. However, GNP was not the only major conservative party. Another conservative party, Liberty Forward Party (LFP) (*Jayuseonjindang*), had an influential candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, who formerly led the GNP. He gained 15.1 percent of the total votes in the 2007 presidential election. Our dependent variable combines the constituents' support for both of these conservative parties. Furthermore, there were other candidates from minor political parties running in the presidential election. In generating our measure, we only include those candidates who received more than one percent of the total votes. Out of the twelve candidates in the 2007 election, only five of them received more than one percent of the total votes. For simplicity's sake, we use the term conservative party throughout the paper to denote these major conservative parties as one group. In the 2012 election, the Saenuri Party was the only major conservative party, with Park Geun-hye as the candidate.

in a district in each of the election years.<sup>18</sup> Our unit of analysis is the district (*eup-myun-dong* in Korean), which is a subdivision of the county unit (*si-gun-gu* in Korean). As of 2012, there were 3,482 districts in Korea in 230 counties. We match each church location to the corresponding district, and sum up the total number in the district to obtain the number of churches per thousand people. In order to measure the population size of each district accurately, we collect the population information in the month of the election from the Resident Registration Data, provided by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. All variables are summarized in Table A.1.

We assume throughout the paper that the number of churches per capita is a good measure of Protestant concentration in a district. But more churches per capita may not necessarily mean more Protestant concentration; there could be a larger number of churches overall, but smaller number of congregants per church. To our knowledge, there is no official statistics on official attendee figures and church size in Korea. In the absence of data on the actual number of congregants for each church, we are not able to address the above concern directly. The Korean population census collects information on the respondent's religious affiliation, but only for every decade with the most recent census conducted in 2005 and 2015, in between which the elections have occurred. Furthermore, the census data on religion are only available at the regional level, with the exception of 2005 for which we were able to obtain the district-level information on the percentage of district residents identified as Protestant. In order to test the relationship between the number of Protestants and the number of churches, we therefore regress the Protestant share of total population on the number of churches at the district level in 2005. Here we also control for the distance to the nearest "megachurch." Megachurches in Korea are well-known for their large sizes and wealth, and their effects on neighboring Protestants and churches. The proximity measure controls for any additional

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<sup>18</sup>In the absence of official repository data on church locations and attendees in Korea, we have obtained commercially available annual lists of church addresses from <http://3590.co.kr/>. The firm offers a representative collection of church addresses similar to other commercial vendors including those from the Christian Journal and Korea Contents Media Editors. Other potential sources including various church associations in South Korea (e.g., <http://www.gapck.org>, <http://www.pck.or.kr>, <http://his.kmc.or.kr>) do not disclose updated lists of their members annually.

pull-effect that megachurches have, as these churches have significantly more attendees than others.<sup>19</sup> In addition to the distance to the nearest megachurch, we also include a number of controls available from the census.<sup>20</sup> Table A.2 in Appendix shows that there is indeed a statistically significant association between the Protestant share of total population and the total number of churches in the district.

## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Election Outcomes

Our election analysis is based on the following equation to capture any differential district-level effect observed in the conservative party candidate’s vote share, due to changes in Protestant concentration between 2007 and 2012:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ConservativeVoteShare}_{dct} = & \beta_0 + \lambda_d + \beta_1 \text{Yr2012} + \beta_2 \text{Protestants}_{dct} + \beta_3 \text{Yr2012} \cdot \text{Protestants}_{dct} \\ & + X'_{dct} B + \varepsilon_{dct}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where  $\text{ConservativeVoteShare}_{dct}$  is the vote share of the conservative party in district  $d$  in county  $c$  in year  $t$ . We present results for the elections below.  $\text{Protestants}_{dct}$ , is our measure of Protestant concentration, the number of Protestant churches per thousand people in district  $d$  in city  $c$  in year  $t$ . The indicator  $\lambda_d$  captures the time-invariant district fixed effect, and the time indicator,  $\text{Yr2012}$  identifies the election period. In the first period, the presidential election occurred in 2007. In the second period, the presidential election took place in 2012.

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<sup>19</sup>We obtain a list of 39 megachurches in Korea from [www.leadnet.org/world](http://www.leadnet.org/world), which defines a megachurch as a church with weekly worship attendance numbers exceeding 2,000, and purportedly lists all the megachurches in the world. The list however includes only the most well-known churches in Korea; given the actual number of large churches in Korea, the number of megachurches from the data is likely underestimated.

<sup>20</sup>These include the total district population, share of population under the age of twenty, population with higher education and the number of households. Both the age and the education factors likely feature prominently in deciding whether to attend church, and individuals in the same household are also likely to have the same religion.

$X$  is a vector of time-varying confounders that we include in our analysis. First, we include the share of young voters at the district level for each year. Korean politics scholars have pointed out the diverging preferences across different generations as a key factor explaining the voter's political ideology and behavior (Lee and Jeong 2007; Noh, Song and Kang 2013). We define the young voter share as the share of district population identified as between the ages 20 and 49. Next, a large number of unobservables, those potentially affecting political preferences of constituents, likely feature at the county level. For example, the level of economic output in each region may correlate with the support for the incumbent party in the run up to the elections (Books and Prysby 1999; Anderson and Roy 2011; Kang 2016), and the level of support may change from one election to another due to economic performance. We include the county-level gross domestic product in 2007 and 2012 to address this alternative mechanism.<sup>21</sup> In addition, we include the total population (in thousands of people) to account for the size of each district. Furthermore, we add the church denomination controls to account for the possibility that certain denominations have particular effects on congregants' voting decisions. We generate the denomination share variables for the five major Protestant denominations, and assign each church to the corresponding group. Finally, the errors are clustered at the county level.

Table 1 presents the results. In the 2007 presidential election, Lee Myung-bak of the main conservative party (GNP) was elected with 48.7 percent of votes. Lee was followed by Chung Dong-young of the largest liberal party (UNPD), who gathered 26.1 percent of the votes. In the 2012 presidential election, the conservative party candidate was again elected as the winner. Park Geun-hye from the Saenuri Party (formerly GNP) was elected with 51.6 percent of the total votes, followed by Moon Jae-in of Democratic United Party (48.0 percent).

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<sup>21</sup>The statistics are from the Korean Bureau of Statistics (KOSIS) and cover all the counties except Seoul, for which we use the available aggregate local GDP figures. Because the presidential elections take place at the end of each year in December, we interpret the GDP figures in 2007 and 2012 as measures of economic output obtained *prior* to the elections and minimize potential endogeneity issues in election outcomes influencing local economic performance.

Table 1 Conservative Party Vote Share in Presidential Elections (2007-2012)

	(1)	(2)
Protestant Concentration $\times$ Y2012	0.1525* (0.0653)	0.1506* (0.0652)
Protestant Concentration	-0.0125 (0.0598)	-0.0139 (0.0592)
Share of Young Voters $\times$ Y2012	-0.0486*** (0.0033)	-0.0487*** (0.0033)
Share of Young Voters	0.0026 (0.0075)	0.0027 (0.0074)
County GDP per capita $\times$ Y2012	-0.0178 (0.0289)	-0.0176 (0.0287)
County GDP per capita	0.0998 (0.0623)	0.1000 (0.0619)
Population $\times$ Y2012	-0.1324*** (0.0176)	-0.1328*** (0.0175)
Population	-0.0274 (0.0266)	-0.0280 (0.0268)
Y2012	13.7067*** (1.5799)	13.7654*** (1.5761)
Constant	57.5935*** (3.6953)	57.5333*** (3.7006)
Denomination Controls	No	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6310	6310

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 1 presents the vote share for the conservative party as the dependent variable in the presidential elections. In 2007, we find no Protestant effect on support for the party. However, constituents in districts with higher Protestant concentration in 2012 are more likely to cast votes for the conservative party candidate, compared to other districts. The coefficient estimate from the Protestant variable interacted with the year 2012 dummy ( $\beta_3$  in Equation 1) gives the differential Protestant impact in 2012 relative to 2007. When the district has one more church per thousand people in 2012, the vote share for the conservative party increases by 0.15 percentage points (Model (1) and (2)). Put differently, one standard deviation increase in the number of churches is associated with an increase in the vote share of the conservative party by 0.54 percentage points.<sup>22</sup> Given the usually competitive elections held between the two parties, particularly in the 2012 election where the margin was only 3.6 percent between the two presidential candidates, the Protestant effect appears to have a sizable impact. The difference between Model (1) and Model (2) is the inclusion of a set of church denomination indicators as additional controls.

Next, we find that the coefficient estimates of our remaining controls correspond to various findings in the existing literature. For example, more young voters (voters of ages between 20 and 49) means a significant drop in the vote share for the conservative party in 2012. A higher regional GDP per capita is not particularly associated with voting patterns, but the size of population has significant negative impact for the conservative party. This is consistent with the existing works on voting behaviors in urban versus rural areas, suggesting that urban voters tend to prefer liberal party candidates while rural voters prefer the opposite (Cho 1994, 2013). Finally, we do not find any notable effects of particular church denominations on the constituents' voting behaviors.

Our empirical specification with district fixed-effects controls for any time-invariant effects at the district level, such as the presence of megachurches (we do not observe any new mega church or location change of existing megachurches between 2007 and 2012) as well as the

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<sup>22</sup>The mean number of church per thousand people is 2.9, and the standard deviation is 3.5

distance to the nearest border with North Korea. However, one may still be concerned about potential time-varying effects of these variables. To address this possibility, we interact the distance from the nearest megachurch and the distance from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with the year 2012 dummy. Table A.3 and Table A.4 show that neither megachurch nor the distance to the DMZ has any differential effect on the 2012 election, while our main variable of interest, Protestant churches per thousand people interacted with the year 2012 dummy, remains significant and positive.

Furthermore, we also test whether support for the conservative party may explain Protestant concentration in a given district, not the other way around. Protestants as a decentralized group does not appeal to politicians for electoral mobilization, i.e. politicians in districts of conservative strongholds would not cater to or somehow attract more Protestants in their constituencies. We thus find this reverse-causal argument to be unlikely under our context, but still test the relationship by regressing the Protestant variable in 2012 on the share of votes for the conservative party in 2007. Table A.5 reports the results, in which we find that the coefficients are statistically insignificant and lend little support for the argument.

What can explain the strong Protestant support for the conservative party in 2012? Our findings do not suggest that Protestants' underlying stance on North Korea only existed between the elections. What they do show instead are escalated concerns over North Korea during this period, triggering Protestants' support for the conservative party.<sup>23</sup> The nationwide support for the conservative party in 2007 was followed by a series of provocations from North Korea, including additional missiles tests, attack on Yeonpyeong Island and sinking of a

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<sup>23</sup>The North Korean security concern has always been present in the public discourse. In October 2002, for instance, North Korea covertly enriched uranium in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and resumed the weaponization program, which consequently led to failed multilateral talks. Beginning in 2006, South Korea again witnessed a series of increasing aggressions from North Korea. North Korea conducted its first nuclear missiles test after its relationship with the Bush administration in the U.S. grew hostile. This came as an unforeseen, shocking betrayal to the South Korean government, especially since then-President and the liberal party leader, Roh Moo-hyun, sought a friendly relationship with the north after taking over the presidential office in 2003 from his predecessor Kim Dae-jung (who also maintained a peaceful relationship with the north with his "Sunshine Policy".) In the months leading up to the 2007 presidential election, the liberal party was heavily criticized for having supported the North Korean regime that in turn developed nuclear weapons. The incumbent party subsequently lost its support base and Lee Myung-bak, the presidential candidate from the conservative party, won a landslide victory backed by both Protestant and non-Protestant voters.

Korean navy submarine (ROKS Cheonan). We argue that these events all contributed to the politicization of Protestants, who became increasingly supportive of the ruling conservative party. While their support was not pronounced in the 2007 election due to the overwhelming nation-wide support that Lee enjoyed, it became much more salient in 2012 when the parties became divided on how to deal with the north.

The year 2012 also saw the burgeoning idea of *jongbuk* being introduced to the public sphere in South Korea.<sup>24</sup> The voters were also primed by a scandal around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the run up to the 2012 election, which was one of the most heated issues during the presidential campaign.<sup>25</sup> The NLL scandal broke two months before the election in December, when the conservative party claimed that then-President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea offered Kim Jong-il, the head of North Korea, part of South Korea's territorial waters around the NLL in the West (Yellow) Sea during an inter-Korean summit in 2007. The NLL issue was at the center of the election campaign, mobilizing conservative and security-concerned voters. It hinted at the possibility that Moon, the presidential candidate for the liberal party in 2012 and the former chief-of-staff under the Roh administration, might concede too much national interest to North Korea, such as South Korea's effectively occupied territory in the West Sea.

The NLL scandal played to the advantage of conservative party and its presidential candidate (Park), by making the North Korean issue especially salient for the 2012 election. It is notable that the two competing parties proposed similar platforms in terms of welfare and economic policies, such as taxation and market regulation. The major difference instead came from attitudes toward the past political repression and North Korea-related issues, which were closely related to each other. Along with Moon's ambivalent position over the ROK-US alliance, the NLL scandal generated a particularly pro-conservative bias among the

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<sup>24</sup>*Jongbuk* literally translates as the followers of North Korea and refers to those who willingly side with the North Korean regime; the term however came to be used in derogatory ways by some of the right-wing activists to label supporters of the opposition party.

<sup>25</sup>Both presidential candidates had pledges on the NLL issue in the election manifesto, which did not exist in the 2007 election. Unlike 2017 when the media did not feature North Korea-related issues prominently before the election, there was intense media coverage of the NLL issue in the run up to the election in 2012.

Protestant constituents in the 2012 election.

## 4.2 Protestants on North Korea

In the above, we have shown South Korean Protestants' leanings for the conservative party. In this section, we attempt to validate whether there is indeed an underlying association between Protestantism and attitudes towards North Korea by looking at individual responses. For this purpose, we analyze the KGSS data using the following specification:

$$\text{Perception}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Protestant}_i + X'_i B + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

We use the *logit* model as our dependent variables are binary.  $\text{Perception}_{it}$  captures individual respondent  $i$ 's attitude towards North Korea in year  $t$ . We construct two key explanatory variables to identify respondent  $i$ 's religion. The first is a religious affiliation measure, in which the respondent is asked to identify which religious group (Protestant being one of them) she belongs to. The other is a continuous variable capturing the respondent's religious behavior, measured by the frequency of church attendance.<sup>26</sup> We also control for a number of individual traits that likely affect the respondent's political attitude. These include educational attainment, age, employment, income, urban residence, gender, marital status and self-identified political ideology. Additionally, we control for regional factors. The regional cleavage is a long-standing empirical trend in elections which have prevailed in Korean politics for several decades (Lee 1998). Constituents living in the southeastern region (Yeongnam) have generally supported the conservative party, while voters living or born in the southwestern region (Honam) have tended to support a moderate liberal party. In order to control for this confounder, we construct dummy variables for these two regions.<sup>27</sup> Next, we employ year fixed effects to address any major national-wide time trends between 2003

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<sup>26</sup>The measure is a normalized score from zero (not Protestant) to one (devout Protestant), based on the respondent's answer to religious affiliation and the frequency of attending religious services.

<sup>27</sup>Throughout KGSS, each respondent's location information is available at the provincial level. To estimate the direct effect of residing in Yeongnam or Honam, we do not use the province fixed effects in the main analyses. Employing province fixed effects, however, does not alter our main results.

and 2016, the period for which KGSS is available.

We argue that security issues related to North Korea are important particularly to Protestants in South Korea, and as we discuss above, their stance on the north stems from Korea's unique historical context. If our argument is valid, we should observe that Protestants have a distinctive view on North Korea, different from those with other religions, as well as those with no religious faith. The first question we analyze is: "What do you think North Korea is for us?" In response, the respondent can choose one of the following: "An object of (1) aid, (2) cooperation, (3) vigilance, (4) animosity". We do not interpret these responses as ordinal, but rather as separate, independent choices. In other words, we do not assume that those who see North Korea as a country in need of aid are necessarily more hospitable to North Korea, than those who believe that they need to cooperate with the north, and *vice versa*. Therefore, we create four indicator variables from this question, assuming that each answer potentially carries a different attitude toward North Korea.<sup>28</sup>

The historical connection to North Korea affects Protestants to perceive the north as an object of aid *and* animosity. Many Protestants in South Korea have been actively engaging in providing educational and medical aid to North Korea. For example, one of the megachurches in Korea, the Somang Church, established Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, the first private university in North Korea in 2010. A large number of smaller churches have also helped in the settlement process of North Korean defectors, and advocated human rights in North Korea. But at the same time, Protestant respondents are less likely to support cooperation with North Korea.

The results presented in Table 2 are consistent with our prediction. For the models with odd numbers, our main independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent declares herself as a Protestant or not. For the even-numbered models, we

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<sup>28</sup>In Appendix Table A.8, we also present multinomial logistic regression outputs as another empirical exercise with the same set of perception variables. In a previous study on religion and Korean politics, Jang and Ha (2011) treat these responses as rank ordered, and use an ordered probit estimation for their analysis. The authors find no association between Protestantism and attitude toward North Korea using this empirical approach.

Table 2 Protestantism and Attitudes Toward North Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	To us, North Korea is an object of ...							
	animosity		vigilance		cooperation		aid	
Protestant	0.123* (0.053)		-0.062 (0.047)		-0.080* (0.039)		0.164* (0.067)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.165** (0.061)		-0.116+ (0.070)		-0.161*** (0.036)		0.345*** (0.082)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. Controls include education level, age, employment, income, urban residence, Honam and Yeongnam regions, gender, marriage, and political ideology. +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Full table available as A.6 in Appendix.

employ the continuous variable that measures how often the respondent goes to church. We find that being a Protestant is positively and significantly correlated with having a hostile attitude against North Korea (Models (1) and (2)). The more devout the respondent is, as measured by the frequency of church attendance, the more antagonistic she is toward the north. At the same time, being a Protestant also means that the respondent is more likely to support providing aid to North Korea (Models (7) and (8)). The findings are again significant for both the dichotomous and continuous Protestant measures. On the contrary, Protestant religiosity reduces the respondent's support for cooperation with North Korea, which requires acknowledging the North Korean regime as legitimate (Models (5) and (6)). We find a negative but generally insignificant association between Protestant religiosity and perceiving the north as an object of vigilance in Models (3) and (4). North Korea as an object of vigilance entails the possibility of engaging in negotiation and cooperation, which Protestant respondents generally object to.<sup>29</sup>

Next, we examine another question which indirectly captures the respondent's attitude toward North Korea. In Table 3, we use the question asking about the country that the

<sup>29</sup>The estimates from the multinomial logit analysis yield the same interpretation. The results in the first two columns of Table A.8 suggest that Protestant respondents are more likely to perceive North Korea as an object of animosity or aid, rather than that of cooperation. Similarly, the next columns show that Protestants are less likely to see North Korea as an object of vigilance or cooperation, rather than that of animosity.

Table 3 Mechanism: Protestantism and Favored Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The country I feel closest to is ...					
	United States		North Korea		China	
Protestant	0.227*** (0.031)		-0.163*** (0.038)		-0.039 (0.035)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.475*** (0.031)		-0.306*** (0.039)		-0.262*** (0.054)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

Controls include education level, age, employment, income, urban residence, Honam and Yeongnam regions, gender, marriage, and political ideology.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$


Full table available as A.7 in Appendix.

respondent feels the closest to. We find that Protestant constituents are more likely to prefer the United States over others (Models (1) and (2)), while less likely to favor North Korea (Models (3) and (4)) or China to some extent (Models (5) and (6)). The favorable response for the United States again has ties with the Protestant root, going back to the American missionaries who played the most critical role in spreading Protestantism in Korea, and the United States' role in the military government in Korea (1945-48), the Rhee administration in South Korea (1948-1960), and particularly in the Korean War (1950-52), as well as in the proliferation of the Protestant church post-War. On the other hand, the negative response of Protestants on China relates to the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing support for the North Korean regime, by taking part in the Korean War and sending economic and military aids as North Korea's closest ally, as well as the Chinese government's repression of the Protestant church.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, we check whether Protestants have changed their political party preferences over the election cycles in 2007 and 2012. Given that they have always maintained strong feelings against the North Korean regime, and security threats increased since 2006 with the first

<sup>30</sup>The results from the multinomial models again lead to similar findings (Table A.9). Using North Korea and United States as the baseline alternatively, we find that Protestants survey respondents are more likely to prefer the United States to North Korea, and less likely to prefer North Korea to the United States.

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Being Protestant on Supporting the Conservative Party



nuclear missiles tests, we predict that their support for the conservative party increased over this time period. For this exercise, we code the support variable as one if the respondent says that she supports the conservative party, and zero otherwise. Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of being a Protestant on conservative party support across different years, with the 95 percent confidence intervals around each coefficient estimate. We note that in 2005, one year before the missiles test began, Protestant respondents did not actually support the party. Their stance appears to have remained ambivalent until 2008, when we do see a positive and statistically significant correlation between Protestants and conservative party support. Over time up to 2012 we see an overall trend towards greater support, although the statistical significance varies depending on the year. Together with Tables 2 and 3, this finding supports our claim that Protestants have been apprehensive of North Korea, remained anti-communist, and become increasingly supportive of the conservative party after the series of military aggressions by North Korea.

One concern that we have on the association between Protestants and their support for the

conservative party is that the link may not come from their attitudes towards North Korea, but rather from a specifically preached set of core Protestant values that somehow align more with the conservative party's policy platforms. If this were true, then the Protestant effect on the conservative party support should not have been significant and positive in the 2012 presidential election, as both the conservative and the liberal party supported similar reformative policies in terms of market regulation and social welfare. We find instead that there was indeed an increased support from Protestants for the conservative party in the 2012 presidential election.

To further validate this point and test whether Protestant constituents hold particularly more conservative ideologies than others, we analyze responses from additional questions in KGSS. We choose commonly used questions on political ideology and policy preferences to measure the conservative leanings of respondents; these cover the self-reported political ideology and the government's role in welfare, taxation, and immigration. Specifically, we employ the following four questions on policy preferences (ordered responses are in brackets): 1) "Who should take responsibility for people's welfare?" ([1] the government-[10] the individual); 2) "Do you think that welfare is more important than economic growth?" ([1] strongly agree-[5] strongly disagree); 3) "Do you think that immigration causes a tax increase?" ([1] strongly agree-[5] strongly disagree); 4) "Do you think that the rich should pay more tax than now?" ([1] strongly agree- [5] strongly disagree). Unlike the attitudes toward North Korea, the results in Table 4 show no significant effects of Protestant religiosity on conservative ideological inclinations of Protestant constituents.<sup>31</sup> These findings therefore reinforce our argument that Korean Protestant constituents support the conservative party because they have distinctive attitudes toward North Korea and its regime, but not because they hold particularly more conservative ideologies or are more supportive of the policy platforms of

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<sup>31</sup>The number of observations for each question varies, as KGSS includes different policy-related questions for respondents each year. Table 4 shows some evidence that Protestants are not conservative on other ideologically divided questions such as that on welfare responsibility of individuals. Protestants, along with Catholics, think the responsibility of welfare provision lies with the Government, rather than individuals. On the other matters, there is no difference between Protestants and the non-religious.

the conservative party.

Table 4 Tests for Ideological Bias among Religious Population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Welfare is individual's responsibility		Welfare is more important than growth		Immigration causes tax increase		The rich should pay more tax	
Protestant (Dummy)	-0.130*	(0.036)	-0.020	(0.092)	-0.049	(0.082)	0.165	(0.126)
Catholic (Dummy)	-0.310**	(0.071)	-0.154	(0.152)	-0.090	(0.074)	-0.038	(0.062)
Buddhist (Dummy)	0.120	(0.080)	0.018	(0.092)	-0.098	(0.107)	0.148*	(0.054)
Other (Dummy)	-0.476	(0.480)	0.000	(.)	0.152	(0.202)	0.000	(.)
Protestant (Continuous)		-0.032		-0.153		-0.024		0.178
		(0.123)		(0.149)		(0.088)		(0.199)
Catholic (Continuous)		-0.306		-0.424*		-0.183		-0.006
		(0.179)		(0.122)		(0.112)		(0.145)
Buddhist (Continuous)		0.648 <sup>+</sup>		0.179		-0.136		0.517*
		(0.286)		(0.161)		(0.260)		(0.164)
Others (Continuous)		-1.158 <sup>+</sup>		0.000		-0.069		0.000
		(0.591)		(.)		(0.430)		(.)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2753	2744	962	961	1355	1342	962	961

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

Individual controls include education, age, employment, income, urban residence, Yeongnam and Honam, gender, political ideology and marital status.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

If Protestantism is associated with election outcomes due to North Korea's religious persecution, can it be that other religious group also found political influence based on their grievance against the north? More so than other religions, the communist regime actively persecuted Catholics for similar reasons as Protestants, although their numbers remained relatively small in the North Korean territory at the time of liberation in 1945.<sup>32</sup> Soon after the Korean War, both Catholic and Protestant organizations have been heavily restricted in North Korea. The plight of Christian persecution in North Korea can be contrasted with

<sup>32</sup>In 1945, there were approximately 190,000 Catholics in the Korean Peninsula, out of which 50,000 of them were in North Korea (Kang 1992).

Buddhism, which can find its root back to the Three Kingdoms Period (372-676 CE) and has remained relatively secure under the communist regime.

In the following, we examine whether Protestants' attitude toward North Korea differs significantly from those of Catholics, Buddhists, other religious groups (including various traditional folk religions, Daoism, Confucianism, and Chondogyo) and those without religion. In Appendix Table A.10, we replicate the results in Table 2 using GSS, but include all types of religion indicators (the omitted group is the non-religious). We find that Protestants continue to have the same attitude towards North Korea as in Table 2. Regardless of whether the baseline comparison group is non-Protestant (in Table 2) or non-religious (Table A.10), Protestant respondents view North Korea as both an object of animosity and aid.

We also find that Catholic respondents do not differ from non-religious respondents in their view of North Korea, while Buddhists appear to share a somewhat similar, antagonistic view as Protestants. These similarities however are no longer evident in Table A.11, in which Buddhists share similar feelings toward the US and North Korea as the omitted non-religious group. Relative to the non-religious, however, Protestant respondents continue to view the United States as their closest country, and North Korea as their least close, as consistent with the results in Table 3. These findings together suggest that although both Catholics and Buddhists share some of the same history in North Korea with Protestants, only Protestants hold consistently strong anti-North Korean attitudes. In fact, Catholics and Buddhists view North Korea to be the country that they feel the closest to (Table A.11). A potential explanation for the difference between the two Christian groups is the material conflict generated by the communist regime's land reform policy following Korea's liberation in 1945. The landlords and businessmen in Pyongyang and the surrounding regions, who readily accepted Protestantism as a harbinger of modernization, often founded churches themselves, in contrast to Catholic chapels set up by local bishops under the directives of the Vatican. Many of these Protestant converts were forced by the communist regime to relinquish their lands to farmer tenants, and defected to the south afterwards (Yoon 2015).

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have investigated the root of Protestants' attitude against North Korea and their conservative leanings under growing security threats. South Korea is a secular democracy with a large concentration of Protestants arguably wielding powerful political influence, especially when it comes to North Korean issues. Specifically, we look at the outcomes during the elections in 2007 and 2012, and find that relative to 2007, districts with more Protestants also witnessed greater support for the conservative party in 2012. With additional analyses using the Korean General Social Survey, we find that there is likely a specific mechanism at play involving Protestants' historical connection with North Korea. North Korea, known for its high concentration of Protestants in the early twentieth century, saw many of them defect to the south after the rise of the communist regime. The spread of Protestantism in South Korea was facilitated by these refugees, who successfully spread anti-communist sentiments amongst the believers in South Korea. We find that when the issue on North Korea and security concerns became highly salient in the run up to the presidential election in 2012, those who identified as Protestants chose to support the conservative party, which has always taken a hardline stance against the legitimacy of the North Korean regime.

Our case study serves as an example of politicization of decentralized religious groups, whose agendas are historically motivated and separate from core religious values and teachings. An extension of our current research would be to investigate whether Protestants in South Korea will continue to have political influence under the increasing secularization trend. The role of megachurches also warrants further research; in what can be described as a highly competitive market, these organizations attract congregants with differentiated services and provisions unavailable in smaller churches. Given their size and influence especially in urban areas, the changes that megachurches have brought on to both religious and secular institutions are significant but unexplored in the literature. Finally, similar exercises focusing on other major religions, and comparing their difference, would contribute to the literature greatly. While we have seen various works in the literature on the importance of

Protestant, Muslim and Catholic faith, there is much yet to be explored for other religious groups and their roles in politics.

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## **Online Appendix**

Hate Thy Communist Neighbor in the North: Protestants and  
Election Outcomes in South Korea

Table A.1 Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<b>PANEL A: Presidential Election</b>					
Vote Share of Conservative Parties	56.469	24.355	4.766	93.358	6806
Share of Young Voters	430.277	87.472	176.263	743.502	6688
Church per 1000	2.826	3.522	0.02	41.096	6310
Population in 1000	14.011	12.286	0	132.108	6806
Local GDP per capita	24.565	16.603	6.162	159.046	6806
Share of Presbyterian Church (Hapdong)	0.324	0.254	0	1	6552
Share of Presbyterian Church (Tonghap)	0.194	0.239	0	1	6552
Share of Methodist Church	0.12	0.189	0	1	6552
Share of Evangelical Holiness Church	0.085	0.151	0	1	6552
Share of Baptist Church	0.048	0.106	0	1	6552
<b>PANEL B: KGSS</b>					
View North Korea as an object of...					
Animosity	0.149	0.356	0	1	18605
Vigilance	0.363	0.481	0	1	18605
Cooperation	0.306	0.461	0	1	18605
Aid	0.159	0.366	0	1	18605
Most Favored country...					
United States	0.589	0.492	0	1	18605
North Korea	0.19	0.392	0	1	18605
China	0.084	0.278	0	1	18605
Protestant (dummy)	0.227	0.419	0	1	18605
Protestant (continuous)	0.141	0.293	0	1	17424
Education	3.481	1.587	0	7	18562
Age	45.029	16.617	18	99	18585
Employed	0.573	0.495	0	1	18605
Income	7.558	5.008	0	21	17792
Urban	0.836	0.37	0	1	18605
Yeongnam	0.279	0.449	0	1	18605
Honam	0.121	0.326	0	1	18605
Male	0.462	0.499	0	1	18605
Married	0.64	0.48	0	1	18605

Table A.2 The Number of Churches and the Share of Protestant Population

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of churches in 2005	0.0195** (0.0062)	0.0134* (0.0065)	0.0233*** (0.0063)
Distance to nearest megachurch (km)	-0.0034 (0.0204)	-0.0025 (0.0203)	-0.0062 (0.0196)
Total Population in 1000		0.0393*** (0.0115)	0.1830** (0.0565)
Share of Pop Under 20			10.0962*** (2.6787)
Share of Higher Edu Pop			8.3254*** (1.6393)
Number of households in 1000			-0.6020** (0.1814)
Constant	16.6115*** (0.7001)	16.1471*** (0.7160)	12.8242*** (0.9059)
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3105	3105	3105

Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.3 The Effect of Megachurch on the 2012 Election

	(1)	(2)
	Share of votes for conservative party	
Megachurch×Y2012	1.1910 (0.8607)	1.1878 (0.8675)
Megacity×Y2012	-3.5634*** (0.9178)	-3.5715*** (0.9151)
City×Y2012	-0.8660 (0.6957)	-0.8651 (0.6984)
Protestant Concentration× Y2012	0.1312* (0.0594)	0.1286* (0.0593)
Protestant Concentration	-0.0108 (0.0571)	-0.0123 (0.0564)
Share of Young Voters × Y2012	-0.0377*** (0.0035)	-0.0377*** (0.0035)
Share of Young Voters	-0.0069 (0.0082)	-0.0067 (0.0081)
County GDP per capita × Y2012	-0.0110 (0.0265)	-0.0107 (0.0263)
County GDP per capita	0.0509 (0.0562)	0.0507 (0.0559)
Population×Y2012	-0.1294*** (0.0162)	-0.1300*** (0.0161)
Population	-0.0387 (0.0251)	-0.0394 (0.0254)
2012	10.1581*** (1.6952)	10.2260*** (1.6871)
Constant	63.0470*** (3.9461)	62.9899*** (3.9724)
Denomination Controls	No	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6310	6310

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Megachurch is the distance to nearest megachurch (km)

Cities are districts with over 50 thousand population.

Megacities are appointed among the cities with over one million population.

Table A.4 The Effect of the DMZ on the 2012 Election

	(1)	(2)
	Share of votes for conservative party	
DMZ×Y2012	0.0042 (0.0030)	0.0043 (0.0030)
Protestant Concentration × Y2012	0.1897** (0.0634)	0.1879** (0.0633)
Protestant Concentration	-0.0398 (0.0575)	-0.0413 (0.0572)
Share of Young Voters × Y2012	-0.0459*** (0.0040)	-0.0460*** (0.0040)
Share of Young Voters	0.0006 (0.0080)	0.0008 (0.0079)
County GDP per capita × Y2012	-0.0165 (0.0290)	-0.0159 (0.0288)
County GDP per capita	0.0950 (0.0623)	0.0945 (0.0620)
Population×Y2012	-0.1296*** (0.0168)	-0.1304*** (0.0167)
Population	-0.0258 (0.0260)	-0.0261 (0.0262)
2012	11.6337*** (2.1642)	11.6574*** (2.1480)
Constant	58.6387*** (3.9183)	58.7117*** (3.9336)
Denomination Controls	No	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6310	6310

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.5 Reverse Causality Test

	(1)
Dep. Var.	Num of Church per capita in 2012
Vote Share of Conservative Parties in the previous election	-0.0293 (0.0239)
Constant	2.1553 <sup>+</sup> (1.2226)
Observations	3081

Si-gun-gu fixed effects are employed.

Standard errors clustered at si-gun-gu level are in parentheses.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.6 Protestantism and Attitudes Toward North Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	To us, North Korea is an object of ...							
	animosity		vigilance		cooperation		aid	
Protestant	0.123*		-0.062		-0.080*		0.164*	
	(0.053)		(0.047)		(0.039)		(0.067)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.165**		-0.116 <sup>+</sup>		-0.161***		0.345***
		(0.061)		(0.070)		(0.036)		(0.082)
Education	-0.169***	-0.169***	-0.050***	-0.048***	0.116***	0.118***	0.087***	0.087***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Age	0.020***	0.020***	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	-0.236***	-0.260***	-0.027	-0.029	0.167***	0.193***	0.070 <sup>+</sup>	0.069 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Income	-0.016***	-0.016***	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.014*	0.014*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.028	-0.032	0.095*	0.100 <sup>+</sup>	0.026	0.026	-0.131**	-0.149***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.048)	(0.038)
Yeongnam	0.048	0.023	0.007	-0.006	-0.014	0.011	0.001	0.002
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.012)
Honam	-0.247***	-0.252***	-0.389***	-0.397***	0.327***	0.356***	0.321***	0.321***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.010)
Male	0.438***	0.458***	-0.063*	-0.063 <sup>+</sup>	0.053*	0.027	-0.235***	-0.229***
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Married	-0.264***	-0.280***	0.072**	0.060*	0.089*	0.105***	0.180***	0.196***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Political ideology	0.030**	0.030**	0.065***	0.070***	-0.016 <sup>+</sup>	-0.020 <sup>+</sup>	-0.032***	-0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	-2.540***	-2.582***	-0.818***	-0.700***	-0.558***	-0.642***	-1.624***	-1.596***
	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.136)	(0.145)	(0.194)	(0.153)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.7 Protestantism and Favored Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The country I feel closest to is ...					
	United States		North Korea		China	
Protestant	0.227*** (0.031)		-0.163*** (0.038)		-0.039 (0.035)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.475*** (0.031)		-0.306*** (0.039)		-0.262*** (0.054)
Education	-0.002 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.024)	0.069*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.014)	-0.086+ (0.048)	-0.070 (0.048)
Age	0.025*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Employed	-0.267*** (0.057)	-0.281*** (0.058)	0.271*** (0.072)	0.298*** (0.067)	0.237*** (0.042)	0.264*** (0.048)
Income	0.008+ (0.005)	0.008+ (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Urban	0.074 (0.045)	0.074+ (0.039)	-0.036 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.076)	0.002 (0.061)	0.011 (0.074)
Yeongnam	0.126*** (0.024)	0.128*** (0.023)	-0.187*** (0.046)	-0.181*** (0.046)	0.045+ (0.026)	0.022 (0.027)
Honam	-0.419*** (0.023)	-0.426*** (0.022)	0.408*** (0.041)	0.405*** (0.041)	0.363*** (0.028)	0.360*** (0.031)
Male	0.232*** (0.025)	0.257*** (0.025)	-0.107+ (0.059)	-0.124+ (0.068)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.161*** (0.043)
Married	-0.025 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.034)	0.206*** (0.042)	0.214*** (0.042)	0.236*** (0.048)	0.253*** (0.052)
Political Ideology	0.063*** (0.008)	0.066*** (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.039*** (0.010)	0.032* (0.013)	0.027+ (0.014)
Constant	-1.553*** (0.152)	-1.543*** (0.144)	-0.493*** (0.138)	-0.416** (0.130)	-1.619*** (0.187)	-1.634*** (0.251)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.8 Protestantism and Attitudes Toward North Korea (Multinomial Logit)

Baseline	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<b>object of cooperation</b>		<b>object of animosity</b>	
<b>animosity</b>				
Protestant	0.159** (0.062)		– –	
[1em] Frequency of Church Attendance		0.249*** (0.037)		– –
<b>vigilance</b>				
Protestant	0.017 (0.039)		-0.142* (0.068)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.038 (0.063)		-0.211* (0.085)
<b>cooperation</b>				
Protestant	– –		-0.159** (0.062)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		– –		-0.249*** (0.037)
<b>aid</b>				
Protestant	0.188* (0.077)		0.029 (0.044)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.387*** (0.080)		0.138 (0.087)
Observations	17365	16289	17365	16289

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables not shown include education, age, employment, income, urban residence, Yeongnam and Honam, gender, marital status, political ideology and constant.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.9 Protestantism and Favored Country (Multinomial Logit)

Baseline	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<b>North Korea</b>		<b>United States</b>	
<b>United States</b>				
Protestant	0.230*** (0.040)		– –	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.442*** (0.039)		– –
<b>Japan</b>				
Protestant	-0.085 (0.068)		-0.316*** (0.045)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		-0.140 (0.123)		-0.582*** (0.107)
<b>North Korea</b>				
Protestant	– –		-0.230*** (0.040)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		– –		-0.442*** (0.039)
<b>China</b>				
Protestant	0.097+ (0.053)		-0.133*** (0.037)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.014 (0.056)		-0.427*** (0.049)
<b>Russia</b>				
Protestant	-0.039 (0.264)		-0.270 (0.250)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		-0.009 (0.516)		-0.451 (0.506)
Observations	16958	15929	16958	15929

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables not shown include education, age, employment, income, urban residence, Yeongnam and Honam, gender, marital status, political ideology and constant.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.10 Religion and Attitudes Toward North Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	To us, North Korea is an object of ...							
	animosity		vigilance		cooperation		aid	
Protestant (Dummy)	0.171*** (0.048)		-0.068 (0.056)		-0.104* (0.043)		0.187* (0.078)	
Catholic (Dummy)	-0.076 (0.088)		-0.065 (0.063)		0.050 (0.043)		0.100 (0.109)	
Buddhist (Dummy)	0.169*** (0.048)		0.012 (0.054)		-0.116** (0.044)		0.034 (0.034)	
Others (Dummy)	-0.123 (0.413)		-0.110 (0.163)		0.526*** (0.154)		-0.714+ (0.426)	
Protestant (Continuous)		0.166* (0.072)		-0.159* (0.077)		-0.164** (0.052)		0.454*** (0.092)
Catholic (Continuous)		-0.227+ (0.129)		-0.352*** (0.094)		0.179 (0.121)		0.569** (0.175)
Buddhist (Continuous)		0.184* (0.093)		-0.108 (0.091)		-0.214 (0.166)		0.546** (0.180)
Others (Continuous)		-0.517 (0.867)		-0.623** (0.214)		1.350** (0.522)		-1.574+ (0.954)
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

Individual controls include education, age, employment, income, urban residence,

Yeongnam and Honam, gender, political ideology and marital status.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.11 Religion and Favored Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The country I feel closest to is ...					
	United States		North Korea		China	
Protestant (Dummy)	0.216*** (0.038)		-0.117*** (0.026)		-0.022 (0.050)	
Catholic (Dummy)	-0.069 (0.119)		0.211+ (0.115)		-0.051 (0.167)	
Buddhist (Dummy)	-0.007 (0.027)		0.060+ (0.034)		0.084 (0.088)	
Others (Dummy)	0.242 (0.220)		-0.211 (0.440)		-0.428 (0.449)	
Protestant (Continuous)		0.408*** (0.045)		-0.208*** (0.020)		-0.234* (0.097)
Catholic (Continuous)		-0.348* (0.154)		0.569*** (0.171)		-0.165 (0.328)
Buddhist (Continuous)		-0.343** (0.123)		0.421** (0.144)		0.382 (0.390)
Others (Continuous)		0.019 (0.396)		-0.593 (1.203)		-1.094 (0.725)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

Controls include education level, age, employment, income, urban residence, Honam and Yeongnam regions, gender, marriage, and political ideology.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# **Online Appendix**

Hate Thy Communist Neighbor in the North: Protestants and  
Election Outcomes in South Korea

Table A.1 Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<b>PANEL A: Presidential Election</b>					
Vote Share of Conservative Parties	56.469	24.355	4.766	93.358	6806
Share of Young Voters	430.277	87.472	176.263	743.502	6688
Church per 1000	2.826	3.522	0.02	41.096	6310
Population in 1000	14.011	12.286	0	132.108	6806
Local GDP per capita	24.565	16.603	6.162	159.046	6806
Share of Presbyterian Church (Hapdong)	0.324	0.254	0	1	6552
Share of Presbyterian Church (Tonghap)	0.194	0.239	0	1	6552
Share of Methodist Church	0.12	0.189	0	1	6552
Share of Evangelical Holiness Church	0.085	0.151	0	1	6552
Share of Baptist Church	0.048	0.106	0	1	6552
<b>PANEL B: KGSS</b>					
View North Korea as an object of...					
Animosity	0.149	0.356	0	1	18605
Vigilance	0.363	0.481	0	1	18605
Cooperation	0.306	0.461	0	1	18605
Aid	0.159	0.366	0	1	18605
Most Favored country...					
United States	0.589	0.492	0	1	18605
North Korea	0.19	0.392	0	1	18605
China	0.084	0.278	0	1	18605
Protestant (dummy)	0.227	0.419	0	1	18605
Protestant (continuous)	0.141	0.293	0	1	17424
Education	3.481	1.587	0	7	18562
Age	45.029	16.617	18	99	18585
Employed	0.573	0.495	0	1	18605
Income	7.558	5.008	0	21	17792
Urban	0.836	0.37	0	1	18605
Yeongnam	0.279	0.449	0	1	18605
Honam	0.121	0.326	0	1	18605
Male	0.462	0.499	0	1	18605
Married	0.64	0.48	0	1	18605

Table A.2 The Number of Churches and the Share of Protestant Population

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of churches in 2005	0.0195** (0.0062)	0.0134* (0.0065)	0.0233*** (0.0063)
Distance to nearest megachurch (km)	-0.0034 (0.0204)	-0.0025 (0.0203)	-0.0062 (0.0196)
Total Population in 1000		0.0393*** (0.0115)	0.1830** (0.0565)
Share of Pop Under 20			10.0962*** (2.6787)
Share of Higher Edu Pop			8.3254*** (1.6393)
Number of households in 1000			-0.6020** (0.1814)
Constant	16.6115*** (0.7001)	16.1471*** (0.7160)	12.8242*** (0.9059)
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3105	3105	3105

Robust standard errors clustered at the city level are in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.3 The Effect of Megachurch on the 2012 Election

	(1)	(2)
	Share of votes for conservative party	
Megachurch×Y2012	1.1910 (0.8607)	1.1878 (0.8675)
Megacity×Y2012	-3.5634*** (0.9178)	-3.5715*** (0.9151)
City×Y2012	-0.8660 (0.6957)	-0.8651 (0.6984)
Protestant Concentration× Y2012	0.1312* (0.0594)	0.1286* (0.0593)
Protestant Concentration	-0.0108 (0.0571)	-0.0123 (0.0564)
Share of Young Voters × Y2012	-0.0377*** (0.0035)	-0.0377*** (0.0035)
Share of Young Voters	-0.0069 (0.0082)	-0.0067 (0.0081)
County GDP per capita × Y2012	-0.0110 (0.0265)	-0.0107 (0.0263)
County GDP per capita	0.0509 (0.0562)	0.0507 (0.0559)
Population×Y2012	-0.1294*** (0.0162)	-0.1300*** (0.0161)
Population	-0.0387 (0.0251)	-0.0394 (0.0254)
2012	10.1581*** (1.6952)	10.2260*** (1.6871)
Constant	63.0470*** (3.9461)	62.9899*** (3.9724)
Denomination Controls	No	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6310	6310

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Megachurch is the distance to nearest megachurch (km)

Cities are districts with over 50 thousand population.

Megacities are appointed among the cities with over one million population.

Table A.4 The Effect of the DMZ on the 2012 Election

	(1)	(2)
	Share of votes for conservative party	
DMZ×Y2012	0.0042 (0.0030)	0.0043 (0.0030)
Protestant Concentration × Y2012	0.1897** (0.0634)	0.1879** (0.0633)
Protestant Concentration	-0.0398 (0.0575)	-0.0413 (0.0572)
Share of Young Voters × Y2012	-0.0459*** (0.0040)	-0.0460*** (0.0040)
Share of Young Voters	0.0006 (0.0080)	0.0008 (0.0079)
County GDP per capita × Y2012	-0.0165 (0.0290)	-0.0159 (0.0288)
County GDP per capita	0.0950 (0.0623)	0.0945 (0.0620)
Population×Y2012	-0.1296*** (0.0168)	-0.1304*** (0.0167)
Population	-0.0258 (0.0260)	-0.0261 (0.0262)
2012	11.6337*** (2.1642)	11.6574*** (2.1480)
Constant	58.6387*** (3.9183)	58.7117*** (3.9336)
Denomination Controls	No	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	6310	6310

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.5 Reverse Causality Test

	(1)
Dep. Var.	Num of Church per capita in 2012
Vote Share of Conservative Parties in the previous election	-0.0293 (0.0239)
Constant	2.1553 <sup>+</sup> (1.2226)
Observations	3081

Si-gun-gu fixed effects are employed.

Standard errors clustered at si-gun-gu level are in parentheses.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.6 Protestantism and Attitudes Toward North Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	To us, North Korea is an object of ...							
	animosity		vigilance		cooperation		aid	
Protestant	0.123*		-0.062		-0.080*		0.164*	
	(0.053)		(0.047)		(0.039)		(0.067)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.165**		-0.116 <sup>+</sup>		-0.161***		0.345***
		(0.061)		(0.070)		(0.036)		(0.082)
Education	-0.169***	-0.169***	-0.050***	-0.048***	0.116***	0.118***	0.087***	0.087***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Age	0.020***	0.020***	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employed	-0.236***	-0.260***	-0.027	-0.029	0.167***	0.193***	0.070 <sup>+</sup>	0.069 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Income	-0.016***	-0.016***	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.014*	0.014*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Urban	-0.028	-0.032	0.095*	0.100 <sup>+</sup>	0.026	0.026	-0.131**	-0.149***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.048)	(0.038)
Yeongnam	0.048	0.023	0.007	-0.006	-0.014	0.011	0.001	0.002
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.012)
Honam	-0.247***	-0.252***	-0.389***	-0.397***	0.327***	0.356***	0.321***	0.321***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.010)
Male	0.438***	0.458***	-0.063*	-0.063 <sup>+</sup>	0.053*	0.027	-0.235***	-0.229***
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Married	-0.264***	-0.280***	0.072**	0.060*	0.089*	0.105***	0.180***	0.196***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Political ideology	0.030**	0.030**	0.065***	0.070***	-0.016 <sup>+</sup>	-0.020 <sup>+</sup>	-0.032***	-0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	-2.540***	-2.582***	-0.818***	-0.700***	-0.558***	-0.642***	-1.624***	-1.596***
	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.169)	(0.197)	(0.136)	(0.145)	(0.194)	(0.153)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.7 Protestantism and Favored Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The country I feel closest to is ...					
	United States		North Korea		China	
Protestant	0.227*** (0.031)		-0.163*** (0.038)		-0.039 (0.035)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.475*** (0.031)		-0.306*** (0.039)		-0.262*** (0.054)
Education	-0.002 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.024)	0.069*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.014)	-0.086+ (0.048)	-0.070 (0.048)
Age	0.025*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Employed	-0.267*** (0.057)	-0.281*** (0.058)	0.271*** (0.072)	0.298*** (0.067)	0.237*** (0.042)	0.264*** (0.048)
Income	0.008+ (0.005)	0.008+ (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Urban	0.074 (0.045)	0.074+ (0.039)	-0.036 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.076)	0.002 (0.061)	0.011 (0.074)
Yeongnam	0.126*** (0.024)	0.128*** (0.023)	-0.187*** (0.046)	-0.181*** (0.046)	0.045+ (0.026)	0.022 (0.027)
Honam	-0.419*** (0.023)	-0.426*** (0.022)	0.408*** (0.041)	0.405*** (0.041)	0.363*** (0.028)	0.360*** (0.031)
Male	0.232*** (0.025)	0.257*** (0.025)	-0.107+ (0.059)	-0.124+ (0.068)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.161*** (0.043)
Married	-0.025 (0.031)	-0.040 (0.034)	0.206*** (0.042)	0.214*** (0.042)	0.236*** (0.048)	0.253*** (0.052)
Political Ideology	0.063*** (0.008)	0.066*** (0.009)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.039*** (0.010)	0.032* (0.013)	0.027+ (0.014)
Constant	-1.553*** (0.152)	-1.543*** (0.144)	-0.493*** (0.138)	-0.416** (0.130)	-1.619*** (0.187)	-1.634*** (0.251)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.8 Protestantism and Attitudes Toward North Korea (Multinomial Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Baseline	<b>object of cooperation</b>		<b>object of animosity</b>	
<b>animosity</b>				
Protestant	0.159** (0.062)		– –	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.249*** (0.037)		– –
<b>vigilance</b>				
Protestant	0.017 (0.039)		-0.142* (0.068)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.038 (0.063)		-0.211* (0.085)
<b>cooperation</b>				
Protestant	– –		-0.159** (0.062)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		– –		-0.249*** (0.037)
<b>aid</b>				
Protestant	0.188* (0.077)		0.029 (0.044)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.387*** (0.080)		0.138 (0.087)
Observations	17365	16289	17365	16289

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables not shown include education, age, employment, income, urban residence, Yeongnam and Honam, gender, marital status, political ideology and constant.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.9 Protestantism and Favored Country (Multinomial Logit)

Baseline	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<b>North Korea</b>		<b>United States</b>	
<b>United States</b>				
Protestant	0.230*** (0.040)		– –	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.442*** (0.039)		– –
<b>Japan</b>				
Protestant	-0.085 (0.068)		-0.316*** (0.045)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		-0.140 (0.123)		-0.582*** (0.107)
<b>North Korea</b>				
Protestant	– –		-0.230*** (0.040)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		– –		-0.442*** (0.039)
<b>China</b>				
Protestant	0.097+ (0.053)		-0.133*** (0.037)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		0.014 (0.056)		-0.427*** (0.049)
<b>Russia</b>				
Protestant	-0.039 (0.264)		-0.270 (0.250)	
Frequency of Church Attendance		-0.009 (0.516)		-0.451 (0.506)
Observations	16958	15929	16958	15929

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables not shown include education, age, employment, income, urban residence, Yeongnam and Honam, gender, marital status, political ideology and constant.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.10 Religion and Attitudes Toward North Korea

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	To us, North Korea is an object of ...							
	animosity		vigilance		cooperation		aid	
Protestant (Dummy)	0.171*** (0.048)		-0.068 (0.056)		-0.104* (0.043)		0.187* (0.078)	
Catholic (Dummy)	-0.076 (0.088)		-0.065 (0.063)		0.050 (0.043)		0.100 (0.109)	
Buddhist (Dummy)	0.169*** (0.048)		0.012 (0.054)		-0.116** (0.044)		0.034 (0.034)	
Others (Dummy)	-0.123 (0.413)		-0.110 (0.163)		0.526*** (0.154)		-0.714+ (0.426)	
Protestant (Continuous)		0.166* (0.072)		-0.159* (0.077)		-0.164** (0.052)		0.454*** (0.092)
Catholic (Continuous)		-0.227+ (0.129)		-0.352*** (0.094)		0.179 (0.121)		0.569** (0.175)
Buddhist (Continuous)		0.184* (0.093)		-0.108 (0.091)		-0.214 (0.166)		0.546** (0.180)
Others (Continuous)		-0.517 (0.867)		-0.623** (0.214)		1.350** (0.522)		-1.574+ (0.954)
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses  
 Individual controls include education, age, employment, income, urban residence,  
 Yeongnam and Honam, gender, political ideology and marital status.  
 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A.11 Religion and Favored Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	The country I feel closest to is ...					
	United States		North Korea		China	
Protestant (Dummy)	0.216*** (0.038)		-0.117*** (0.026)		-0.022 (0.050)	
Catholic (Dummy)	-0.069 (0.119)		0.211+ (0.115)		-0.051 (0.167)	
Buddhist (Dummy)	-0.007 (0.027)		0.060+ (0.034)		0.084 (0.088)	
Others (Dummy)	0.242 (0.220)		-0.211 (0.440)		-0.428 (0.449)	
Protestant (Continuous)		0.408*** (0.045)		-0.208*** (0.020)		-0.234* (0.097)
Catholic (Continuous)		-0.348* (0.154)		0.569*** (0.171)		-0.165 (0.328)
Buddhist (Continuous)		-0.343** (0.123)		0.421** (0.144)		0.382 (0.390)
Others (Continuous)		0.019 (0.396)		-0.593 (1.203)		-1.094 (0.725)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17746	16627	17746	16627	17746	16627

Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

Controls include education level, age, employment, income, urban residence, Honam and Yeongnam regions, gender, marriage, and political ideology.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$